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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (IRS) SUMMONS
ENFORCEMENT- WHEN AN IRS INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN COORDI-
NATED BY A JUSTICE DEPARTMENT STRIKE FORCE, THE DISTRICT
COURT MUST DETERMINE THAT EACH SUMMONS ISSUED WAS NOT USED
FOR AN IMPROPER CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PURPOSE.
United States v. Serubo (1979)
A Special Agent of the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS or Service) conducted a joint civil and criminal tax investigation
of the defendant Serubo.' During the first phase of the investigation, 2 the
agent, acting alone, issued twenty-two administrative summonses to obtain
Serubo's tax records.3 Subsequently, the Justice Department's Philadelphia
Strike Force, 4 suspecting that Serubo had contacts with organized crime, 5
became involved in the investigation. 6 Thirteen additional administrative
summonses were issued durirtg this second phase of the investigation, 7
which was coordinated by a Strike Force attorney.8
As a result of this joint investigation, 9 an indictment was returned
against Plachter and Serubo, as officers and controlling stockholders of the
1. United States v. Serubo, 460 F. Supp. 689, 695-96 (E.D. Pa. 1978), vacated and re-
manded, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979). A Special Agent assigned to the narcotics group of the
Intelligence Division-the criminal branch-of the IRS received information from the Federal
Drug Enforcement Administration suggesting that Serubo was involved with organized crime,
loansharking, and the financing of narcotics transactions. 460 F. Supp. at 695. An investigation
was commenced on June 6, 1974, to determine whether these allegations were true, and, if so,
whether the income from the alleged illegal activities had been reported for tax purposes. Id. at
696. For a discussion of the power of the IRS to investigate both civil and criminal violations,
see notes 22-26 and accompanying text infra.
2. The district court found that the investigation was conducted in two phases. 460 F.
Supp. at 696. During the first phase, between June, 1974, and April, 1975, the IRS acted alone
in its investigation of Serubo. Id.
3. Id. Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Service to issue sum-
monses. I.R.C. § 7602. For the text of § 7602, see note 27 infra.
4. The Philadelphia Strike Force is an office of the Organized Crime and Racketeering
Section of the Justice Department. 460 F. Supp. at 696. The Intelligence Division of the IRS
investigates alleged criminal violations of the tax laws. See note 23 infra. IRS special agents are
employed by the Intelligence Division to carry out criminal investigations and, if enough evi-
dence is gathered, the IRS may recommend prosecution to the Department of Justice. Id. For a
discussion of the organization of the IRS and its interaction wiih the Department of Justice, see
notes 21-26 and accompanying text infra.
5. 460 F. Supp. at 696. In the summer of 1974, the Philadelphia Strike Force learned of
the possibility that Plachter-Serubo Cadillac Company of which the defendant was a controlling
stockholder, was involved with elements of organized crime. Id.
6. Id. In April, 1975, the IRS was authorized by the Department of Justice to disclose
information concerning the income tax investigation to the Strike Force. Id. On April 29, 1975,
the investigations of Serubo by the Justice and Treasury Departments were coordinated under
the supervision of a Strike Force attorney. Id.
7. Id. at 697.
8. Id. See note 6 supra.
9. The IRS agent participating in the second phase of the investigation did not recommend
criminal prosecution until January, 1977, and a formal recommendation from the IRS to the
Justice Department was not forthcoming until November, 1977. 460 F. Supp. at 697.
(934)
1
Baker: Administrative Law - Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Summons Enfor
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
Plachter-Serubo Cadillac Company, charging each of them with conspiracy
to evade corporate taxes and with evasion of personal income taxes. 10 The
defendants moved to dismiss the indictment or to supress certain evidence,
charging, inter alia," that the IRS had used its civil summons power to
conduct a criminal investigation.' 2
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania denied these pretrial motions 13 and, with regard to the first stage of
the investigation, denied the defendants' request for additional discovery of
records obtained from the IRS investigation because the defendants had
failed to establish that the summonses had been issued in bad faith. 14 Al-
though the district court suspected that the summonses involved in the sec-
ond stage of the investigation might have been issued in bad faith, the trial
judge found it unnecessary to supress the evidence since he believed the
special agent's testimony that none of the evidence had been used for crimi-
nal prosecution purposes. 15  Immediately prior to both the trial and their
sentencing, the defendants moved for reconsideration of their pretrial mo-
10. Id. at 692. The indictment charged Plachter and Serubo with falsely labeling personal
expenditures as business expenses on corporate tax returns and with failing to report the expen-
ditures as personal income. Id. Defendant Brown, as Comptroller of the Company, was charged
with aiding and abetting Plachter and Serubo in the commission of these crimes. Id. See 604
F.2d at 809.
11. The defendants' pretrial motions also charged the government attorneys with prosecuto-
rial misconduct before the grand jury, claiming that the defendants had been investigated and
prosecuted by means of an invidiously discriminatory process. 460 F. Supp. at 701. The court
denied the motion on the ground of lack of evidence. Id. The defendants also moved to dismiss
for preindictment delay due to a four year time lapse between the commencement of the inves-
tigation and the return of the indictment. Id. The court denied the motion on the ground that
the defendants had failed to prove substantial prejudice as a result of the delay. Id. at 700. The
defendants moved for severance of the personal and corporate income tax charges, claiming that
the indictment failed to allege the necessary factual connection between the counts as required
by rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 693. The court also denied this
motion, finding that the connection between the counts was sufficient under rule 8. Id. at 694.
See FED. R. CaIM. P. 8.
12. 460 F. Supp. at 695. For a discussion of the impropriety of the IRS using its civil
summons power to conduct criminal investigations, see notes-31-33 and accompanying text in-
fra.
13. 460 F. Supp. at 695.
14. Id. at 698-99. The court determined that, although the investigation of Serubo had ini-
tially been undertaken to discover criminal activity, the IRS was also concerned with discover-
ing Serubo's civil liability. Id. at 698. During the first phase of the investigation, the agent had
not made a decision to recommend criminal prosecution and did not transmit any of the evi-
dence obtained to any criminal investigation agency. Id. Having thus found a proper civil pur-
pose for the summonses, the court concluded that there was no bad faith present on the part of
the IRS during the first phase of the investigation. Id. Further finding that the defendants had
failed to make even a colorable showing of bad faith, the court refused their request for addi-
tional discovery of government records which might have revealed evidence of bad faith. Id.
For a discussion of the test which the court relied upon to determine the existence of bad faith,
see notes 30-31 and accompanying text infra.
15. 460 F. Supp. at 699. The court reasoned that, since none of the evidence obtained
through the summonses had been presented to the Grand Jury and was not to be presented at
trial, no evidence existed which could be suppressed and, therefore, the issue was rendered
moot. Id.
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tions for additional discovery. 16 The district court denied the motion for
reconsideration 17 and the defendants appealed.' 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 1 reversed the
district court's denial of the defendants' motions and remanded for additional
discovery to examine the purpose for each of the summonses issued during
the second phase of the investigation, 20 holding that when an IRS investiga-
tion has been coordinated by a Strike Force attorney, the district court must
determine that each summons issued was not used for the improper purpose
of conducting a criminal investigation. United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807
(3d Cir. 1979).
The IRS is responsible for the enforcement of the federal tax laws. 21
The Service is organized into a civil 22 and a criminal branch.2 3  The civil
Audit Division and the criminal Intelligence Division may coordinate their
investigative activities in order to accommodate the possible existence of
both civil and criminal violations in a particular case.2 4 Upon a recommen-
16. 604 F.2d at 809. On the day of trial, defendants pleaded guilty to all counts after the
court had denied their motions for reconsideration of the motions to dismiss the indictment. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 808. The defendants' guilty pleas were conditioned upon their retention of the
right to appeal from the denial of their pretrial motions. Id. For a discussion of these motions,
see notes 11-12 and accompanying text supra.
19. The case was decided by Judges Aldisert, Gibbons, and Van Dusen. Judge Gibbons
wrote the opinion.
20. 604 F.2d at 813. The Third Circuit did not address the district court's holding that the
suppression issue was moot but must have rejected this finding since it remanded for additional
discovery relating to the validity of the summons. Id. For a discussion of the suppression issue,
see note 15 and accompanying text supra.
21. See Internal Revenue Service Organization and Functions, 39 Fed. Reg. 11,572 (1974).
Section 1111.1 of this Administrative Notice provides:
The mission of the Service is to encourage and achieve the highest possible degree of
voluntary compliance with the tax laws and regulations and to maintain the highest degree
of public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the Service. This includes com-
municating the requirements of the law to the public, determining the extent of com-
pliance and causes of non-compliance, and doing all things needful to a proper enforce-
ment of the law.
Id.
22. Id. at 11,578. The Audit Division is the civil branch of the IRS and is responsible for
encouraging voluntary compliance with the tax laws by developing and supervising examination
programs. Id.
23. Id. at 11,607. The Intelligence Division is charged with the enforcement of criminal
statutes involving the tax laws through investigation of alleged criminal violations of such laws
and the recommendation of prosecution to the Department of Justice in appropriate cases. Id.
Upon request, the Division will assist other Intelligence offices in special inquiries, including
those involving organized wagering, racketeering, and other illegal activity, and will also assist
United States Attorneys and the IRS Regional Counsel in the preparation and trial of cases. Id.
24. Id. at 11,581. Section 1113.563 of the IRS organization and functions notice authorizes
the Audit Division to participate with special agents of the Intelligence Division in conducting
tax fraud investigations. Id.
[VOL. 25: p. 934
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dation from the Service, 25 the Department of Justice is responsible for pro-
secution of any criminal violation of the federal revenue laws. 26
In order to aid the Service in its investigative function, section 7602 of
the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the examination of all relevant books
and records and provides for the use of a summons to obtain production of
these materials. 27  Enforcement of the summons rests with the district
court 28 which is required to hold a hearing and decide whether or not to
25. Id. at 11,602 Section 1116(3) of the IRS organizations and functions notice provides in
pertinent part:
The Regional Counsel's office is responsible for the performance of legal services in
the field in connection with criminal cases arising under the internal revenue laws. The
office reviews recommendations of prosecution in criminal cases received in the field, and
prepares and refers such cases . . . to the Department of Justice or, where authorized by
the Department of Justice, directly to United States Attorneys ...
Id.
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 547(1)(1976). Violation of the federal tax laws carries both civil and
criminal penalties. Tax evasion and failure to pay an imposed tax are both felonies punishable by
fines or imprisonment. I.R.C. §§ 7201-02. The filing of fraudulent returns is also a felony. Id. §
7206. Section 6653(b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides, inter alia, for the addition of a
fine in an amount equal to the amount of any underpayment due to the filing of a fraudulent tax
return. Id. § 6653(b). See also id. §§ 7203-05, 7207 (authorizing penalties of fines and/or impris-
onment).
The legislative history of the summons authority under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
supports the conclusion that the federal revenue laws are both civil and criminal in nature. See
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. A436 (1954), reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs 4584; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 617 (1954), reprinted in [1954] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5268 (discussing predecessor statute from which I.R.C. § 7602 is
derived without change in meaning).
27. I.R.C. § 7602. Section 7602 provides:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where
none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax
or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of
any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or
material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer
or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of
account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required
to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary may deem proper, to appear before
the Secretary at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books,
papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be rele-
vant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, tinder oath, as may be relevant
or material to such inquiry.
Id.
28. Id. § 7604(a). Section 7604(a) provides in pertinent part:
If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to
produce books, papers, records, or other data, the United States district court for the
district in which such person resides or is found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate
process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, records, or
other data.
1979-1980]
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compel compliance. 29  At the summons enforcement proceeding, the tax-
payer may challenge the validity of the summons on the ground that it was
issued for an improper purpose. 30 Proof that a summons was issued solely
to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution is enough to establish an im-
proper purpose and serves as an effective defense to judicial enforcement of
a section 7602 summons. 31
Faced with an improper criminal investigation purpose challenge in
Donaldson v. United States, 32 the United States Supreme Court created a
two-pronged test for evaluating the validity of an IRS summons by holding
that "under [section] 7602 an internal revenue summons may be issued in
aid of an investigation if it is issued in good faith and prior to a recommenda-
29. For a discussion of the procedure followed by the district court when a person refuses to
obey a summons, see id. § 7604(b).
30. United States v: Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964). The Supreme Court held in Powell that it
would be an abuse of judicial authority to enforce a summons that had been issued for an
improper purpose "such as to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle a collateral
dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation." Id.
at 58. The Powell Court established the following standards which must be met before a court
will enforce a summons:
(1) the investigation must be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose;
(2) the inquiry must be relevant to that purpose;
(3) the information sought must not be already within the possession of the Service;
and
(4) the administrative procedures of the Code must have been followed.
Id. at 57-58. A showing that any one of these requirements has not been met is a defense to the
enforcement of an administrative summons. Id.
31. United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953) In O'Connor, one of the
first cases to deal with the improper criminal investigation purpose defense, the taxpayer's ac-
countant was summoned by a special agent of the Intelligence Division of the IRS to produce
certain records. Id. at 249. At the time the summons was issued, the taxpayer was under
indictment and the special agent admitted that one of his purposes in issuing the summons was
to aid the Department of Justice in the criminal prosecution. Id. at 250. Finding that the special
agent had no civil interest in the case, the court held that the IRS is not authorized to issue a
summons solely to aid a criminal prosecution since it is the province of a grand jury to conduct
criminal investigations. Id. at 251. The court based its conclusion on the constitutional role of
the grand jury as "the inquisitorial body provided by our fundamental law to subpoena docu-
ments required in advance of a criminal trial, and in the preparation of an indictment or its
particularization." Id. The fifth amendment establishes the grand jury as the sole body with the
power to return federal criminal indictments. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The United States Supreme Court first addressed this improper purpose issue by way of
dictum in Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964). In Reisman, a taxpayer sought to enjoin the
enforcement of a summons but the Court ordered enforcement, concluding that the taxpayer
had been provided with a full opportunity for judicial review before coercive sanctions were
imposed. Id. at 450. The Reisman Court stated that a taxpayer may challenge a summons on the
ground that the "material is sought for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a
criminal prosecution." Id. at 449 (dictum) (citations omitted).
32. 400 U.S. 517 (1971). An IRS special agent issued a summons to the taxpayer's former
employer ordering the production of employment records that might relate to the taxpayer's tax
liability. Id. at 519. The taxpayer claimed that the agent was investigating him solely for a
criminal prosecution purpose and obtained a temporary restraining order preventing compliance
with the summons. Id. at 521. The United States moved for enforcement of the summons and
the motion was granted. Id. at 520. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to
enforce the summons and, on appeal, the Supreme Court also affirmed. Id. at 522.
[VOL. 25: p. 934
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tion for criminal prosecution." 33 Among the circuits addressing the issue of
the proper standard to apply in summons enforcement proceedings, two ap-
proaches for assessing the validity of a summons, based upon differing in-
terpretations of the Donaldson test, have emerged.3 4 Some circuits have
applied the mechanical or objective approach which provides for the nonen-
forcement of a summons only when it is issued at the time of a pending
criminal charge or prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution.3 5
Others have employed the good faith or subjective approach which requires
a determination of whether the summons was issued solely for a criminal
investigation purpose and focuses upon whether or not the summons was
issued in good faith by examining the subjective intent of the special agent
investigating the case. 36
33. Id. at 536. The Donaldson Court recognized the dual civil and criminal investigative
purposes of the tax laws and the likelihood that many civil tax investigations will eventually
result in criminal prosecutions. Id. at 534-35. The appearance of a special agent in a case, it was
held, does not in itself render an investigation impermissible and deprive a summons of its
validity. Id. at 535-36. The Court only proscribed the enforcement of a summons "where the
sole objective of the investigation is to obtain evidence for use in a criminal prosecution." Id. at
533 (emphasis added). The Court adopted the good faith standard of United States v. Powell,
379 U.S. 48 (1964), for application in summons enforcement proceedings. See 400 U.S. at 526-
27, 536. For a discussion of the good faith requirements enunciated in Powell, see note 30
supra.
34. For a discussion of the various interpretations of the Donaldson standard, see notes
35-36 and accompanying text infra. All of the courts applying Donaldson agree that the use of a
§ 7602 summons to aid tax investigations with the potential for both civil and criminal conse-
quences is proper but that it is an abuse of the summons authority to use it solely for criminal
investigation purposes. See cases cited notes 35-36 infra.
35. See United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978); United States
v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Troupe, 438 F.2d 117 (8th
Cir. 1971). The objective approach emphasizes the second prong of the Donaldson test. See
note 33 and accompanying text supra.
In Troupe, the Eighth Circuit enforced a summons despite evidence revealing that the
investigation was initiated on information that the taxpayer was included in a list of alleged
underworld figures. 438 F.2d at 119. Since no criminal charge was pending against the tax-
payer, the court concluded that the summons had been issued for a proper purpose. Id.
Similarly in Hodge & Zweig, the Ninth Circuit found a summons to be enforceable against
the taxpayer's attorney despite the fact that the taxpayer was under indictment at the time of its
issuance. 548 F.2d at 1351. The court stated: "Absent an independent showing of bad faith or
an improper purpose, . . . enforcement of an IRS summons under the Donaldson rule should
be denied only if the summons is issued after the IRS has made a formal recommendation to
the Justice Department for criminal prosecution." Id.
Finally, in Morgan Guaranty, the IRS issued a summons to the taxpayers' bank for the
production of certain records relevant to its investigation. Id. at 37. The taxpayers ordered the
bank not to comply and intervened in the action to prevent enforcement of the summons on the
ground that it had been issued solely in aid of a criminal investigation. Id. at 38. This allegation
was based on the IRS agent's oral statement that his interest in the taxpayers was only for
purposes of a criminal investigation. Id. The court concluded that this statement did not justify
denying enforcement since no recommendation for prosecution had been made, and since the
IRS still had "an appropriate interest in determining whether the taxpayers were liable for
[civil] deficiencies and penalties." Id. at 42. The Second Circuit construed Donaldson as "laying
down an objective test prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution, that would avoid a
need for determining the thought processes of special agents." Id. at 41.
36. See United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 554 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437 U.S.
298 (1978); United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Laflko, 520
F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Wall Corp., 475 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1972). This subjective approach focuses on the
first prong of the Donaldson test. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
1979-19801
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 6 [1980], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol25/iss6/4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
The recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. LaSalle National
Bank 37 resolved this conflict between the circuits by adopting a modification
In Wall, the IRS issued a summons to a corporation for the production of records pertain-
ing to the tax liability of its sole stockholder. 475 F.2d at 893. The taxpayer challenged the
validity of the summons on the ground that it had been used solely for the purpose of gathering
information to be used in a criminal prosecution. Id. at 894. The District of Columbia Circuit
upheld enforcement, finding that although the only agent working on the case was with the
Intelligence Division-whose function is to investigate criminal allegations -this fact alone
was insufficient to establish bad faith in the sense of a fixed purpose to recommend criminal
prosecution." Id. at 895. Nevertheless, the court also found that a showing that criminal pro-
secution had not been recommended was not enough, by itself, to establish a proper purpose;
rather, good faith must also be shown. Id. As the Wall court stated:
Our inquiry is not ended upon a determination that prosecution has neither been insti-
gated nor recommended, since Donaldson also requires that a summons be issued "in
good faith." Thus, if it can be shown that the investigating agent had already formed a
firm purpose to recommend criminal prosecution even though he had not as yet made a
formal recommendation, issuance of the summons would presumably be in bad faith.
Similarly, if the civil liability were already determined, the summons would appear to be
solely for a criminal purpose.
Id.
In Weingarden, the IRS issued a summons to the taxpayer's accountant to obtain records
that were pertinent to the investigation. 473 F.2d at 456. The accountant failed to comply with
the summons and the IRS agent filed a petition in the district court for enforcement of the
summons. Id. at 457. The taxpayer intervened and the Sixth Circuit upheld enforcement, find-
ing that the investigation was to determine civil liability and not for the purpose of criminal
prosecution. Id. The court rejected the interpretation of Donaldson which emphasizes the re-
commendation of prosecution issue and found the proper standard to be "whether the sole
purpose of the issuance of the summons is for criminal prosecution." Id. at 460. Thus, Weingar-
den illustrates that, under the subjective approach, a determination of good faith turns on the
purpose for which the summons is issued. Id.
In Friedman, the IRS issued summonses to banks and an accountant for the purpose of
investigating the tax liabilities of two individuals and a corporation. 532 F.2d at 928. The tax-
payers intervened and challenged the enforcement of the summonses based on allegations that
they were issued solely to obtain evidence of criminal violations. Id. at 932. The Third Circuit
upheld enforcement, finding that the investigating agents had formed no firm purpose to re-
commend prosecution at the time the summonses were issued. Id. The court found that the
special agents' recommendation of prosecution would be the "sole bar to judicial enforcement."
Id. See also United States v. Lafko, 520 F.2d at 622.
In LaJko, the Audit and Intelligence divisions of the IRS conducted a joint investigation of
the taxpayer. Id. at 623. In September, 1973, the special agent recommended to the Regional
Counsel's office that the taxpayer be prosecuted criminally. Id. In December, 1973, the IRS
issued a § 7602 summons to the taxpayer's accountant for the production of the taxpayer's
federal income tax returns and attached work papers. Id. at 624. The taxpayer intervened and
challenged enforcement on the ground that the IRS was improperly using its summons authority
to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution. Id. The Third Circuit denied enforcement of the
summons and remanded for a further evidentiary hearing to determine whether the summons
had been issued in good faith. Id. at 627. The court determined that the question of good faith
is entirely separate from the question of whether a formal recommendation of prosecution has
been made, and held that a "Justice Department recommendation to prosecute is not the sine
qua non for proving that an Internal Revenue summons was issued for an improper purpose."
Id. at 625. The court interpreted the relevant language in Donaldson to mean that a recom-
mendation to prosecute made within the IRS by an agent to his superiors is enough to cast
doubt on the validity of summonses issued after such a recommendation. Id. For a further
discussion of LaJko, see notes 43-44 and accompanying text infra.
Finally, in LaSalle, the Seventh Circuit considered the agent's personal motivation in using
the summons to be the correct test for determining whether it was solely for use in a criminal
prosecution. 554 F.2d at 309. For subsequent developments as a result of the LaSalle appeal,
see notes 37-46 and accompanying text infra.
37. 437 U.S. 298 (1978), revg 554 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1977). In LaSalle, an IRS special agent
940 [VOL. 25: p. 934
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of the objective approach and retaining the good faith inquiry of the subjec-
tive approach only for summonses issued prior to a recommendation of pros-
ecution.3 8 The Court accepted the proposition that a summons issued
solely to gather evidence for a criminal investigation is improper and should
not be enforced.3 9 However, a summons issued in good faith and before
the Service recommends criminal prosecution to the Justice Department is
valid. 40 According to the Court, the relevant inquiry for determining
whether an investigation is solely for a criminal purpose focuses on whether
or not the Service, as an institution, 4 has abandoned the good faith pursuit
of civil tax determination or collection. 42  The Court rejected the approach
was assigned to investigate possible criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code by tax-
payer John Gattuso. 437 U.S. at 300. The respondent bank held land trusts for Gattuso and the
special agent issued two § 7602 summonses to the respondent in order to determine the accu-
racy of Gattuso's income reports. Id. at 301. After the respondent had refused to produce the
requested material, the United States petitioned the district court for enforcement of the sum-
monses. Id. at 302. The court denied enforcement, finding that the special agent had conducted
the investigation for the sole purpose of uncovering criminal conduct in violation of the
Donaldson provision that a summons must be issued in good faith. Id. at 304. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed the denial of enforcement, 554 F.2d at 309, but its decision was reversed by
the Supreme Court. 437 U.S. at 304.
38. 437 U.S. at 318. For a review of the conflict over whether to apply the objective or
subjective approach in summons enforcement proceedings, see notes 34-36 and accompanying
text supra.
39. 437 U.S. at 316 n. 18. Recognizing the interrelated criminal and civil nature of a tax
fraud inquiry, the Court stressed that '[for a fraud investigation to be solely criminal in nature
would require an extraordinary departure from the normally inseparable goals of examining
whether the basis exists for criminal charges and for the assessment of civil penalties." Id. at
314.
40. Id. at 318. It should be noted that this holding reaffirms the two-pronged test of
Donaldson. See note 33 and accompanying text supra. The Court also incorporated the stan-
dards of good faith enunciated in United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), into its holding
and stated that "'the Service at all times must use the summons authority in good-faith pursuit of
the congressionally authorized purposes of § 7602." 437 U.S. at 318. For a discussion of the
Powell standards, see note 30 supra.
41. Given the many levels of review to which the recommendations of a single IRS agent
are subject, the Court concluded that an examination of the agent's subjective intent would not
be dispositive in determining the actual purpose of the investigation. 437 U.S. at 315-16.
Before being forwarded to the Justice Department, the agent's recommendation is re-
viewed by various divisions of the IRS. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 601.107(b)-(c) (1977). The LaSalle
Court noted that the case is only sent to the justice Department when the officials of at least
two stages of review agree with the recommendation to prosecute. 437 U.S. at 315. As the
Court pointed out, "[a]t any of the various stages, the Service can abandon the criminal pros-
ecution, can decide instead to assert a civil penalty, or can pursue both goals." Id. Thus, the
Court concluded, any judicial inquiry must focus on the motives of the Service as an institution.
Id. at 318. The Court expressed disapproval of an intentional delay in submitting a recommen-
dation to the Justice Department merely to gather additional evidence for the prosecution. Id.
at 317. Such a delay would, the Court asserted, be tantamount to the IRS becoming "an
information-gathering agency" for the Department of justice. Id.
42. 437 U.S. at 316. This good faith inquiry focuses upon the institutional posture of the
IRS. Id. Courts applying this standard must determine whether the IRS is honestly pursuing
the goals of § 7602-i.e., the investigation of civil liability. Id.
In establishing this standard, the Court determined that the burden is upon those opposing
enforcement of a summons to disprove the existence of a valid civil purpose and admitted that
this burden is a "heavy one." Id. For a further discussion of the burden of proof issue, see note
50 infra.
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adopted by the Third Circuit in United States v. Lafko, 43 which focused on
whether the individual investigating agent has recommended prosecution to
his superiors. 44
While the institutional posture test answered the question of what stan-
dard to apply in determining the validity of a summons, the LaSalle Court
offered no guidance as to what constitutes institutional good faith, 4 5 thus
leaving the circuits to fashion their own procedural requirements. In apply-
ing the institutional posture standard to summons enforcement proceedings,
the Second and Fourth Circuits have accepted an affidavit from the Service,
asserting a proper civil purpose of the IRS, as proof of institutional good
faith in satisfaction of the LaSalle test.4 6
The Third Circuit, however, has taken a more restrictive view and is
the only circuit to require a summons-by-summons inquiry. 47 In United
43. 520 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1975). For a review of the Laflo decision, see note 36 supra.
44. 437 U.S. at 313 n.15. In a footnote to its opinion, the LaSalle Court indicated that the
Third Circuit's view that Donaldson intended to "'draw a line at the recommendation to the
Service's district office from the Special Agent, rather than at the recommendation from the
Service to the Justice Department," was a misreading of the Donaldson Court's intent. Id. For
a review of Donaldson, see notes 32-33 and accompanying text supra.
45. 437 U.S. at 318. Although the Court reaffirmed the standards of good faith enunciated
in United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), it gave no direction as to how these standards
would apply to the institutional posture test. 437 U.S. at 318.
LaSalle was a five to four decision by the Supreme Court. Id. at 299. Justice Stewart,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Stevens, dissented vigorously, stating
that the "elusiveness of 'institutional good faith' as described by the Court can produce little but
endless discovery proceedings and ultimate frustration of the fair administration of the Internal
Revenue Code." Id. at 320 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissenters would have adopted the
objective approach enunciated by the Second Circuit in United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust
Co., 572 F.2d 36 (1978). Id. For a review of this objective approach, see note 35 and accom-
panying text supra.
46. See United States v. McGuirt, 588 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Marine
Midland Bank, 585 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978). The Fourth Circuit delayed its decision in McGuirt
until after LaSalle was decided. 588 F.2d at 420. In applying the institutional posture test, the
court held that "[t]he petition with its supporting affidavit which asserted the continuing good
faith purpose of the IRS prior to any institutional recommendation for prosecution to the De-
partment of Justice, constituted a prima facie showing sufficient to warrant enforcement." Id. at
421.
In Marine Midland Bank, the Second Circuit stated: "Enforcement delays and litigation can
best be avoided by prompt and full disclosure by the IRS, by affidavit or otherwise, of the point
to which criminal recommendations have gone and the extent to which civil collection efforts
are continuing at the time of consideration of applications for enforcement orders." 585 F.2d at
38-39.
In United States v. Schutterle, 586 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1978), the Eighth Circuit merely
examined the time gap between issuance of the summons and recommendation of prosecution
and, upon finding no unreasonable delay, concluded that there had been no abandonment of a
civil purpose in an institutional sense. Id. at 1204. The Eighth Circuit appears to have the most
liberal requirements for establishing institutional good faith of all the post-LaSalle decisions.
The Third Circuit, on the other hand, is the most stringent. See text accompanying note 47
infra.
47. See United States v. Censer, 595 F.2d 146 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 928 (1979);
notes 48-52 and accompanying text infra. Compare note 46 and accompanying text supra with
notes 48-57 & 66-78 and accompanying text infra.
[VOL. 25: p. 934
9
Baker: Administrative Law - Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Summons Enfor
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
States v. Genser (Genser JI),48 the court, reviewing the matter for the sec-
ond time after having remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing in a
previous decision (Genser J),49 held that LaSalle required a judicial inquiry
to determine whether an individual summons was issued for a legitimate
civil purpose, rather than whether there was a general civil purpose for the
investigation as a whole. 50 The court held that a particular summons which
is found to have been issued solely for a criminal investigation purpose must
be suppressed 5 ' regardless of the existence of a proper civil purpose for the
48. 595 F.2d 146 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 928 (1979). The appellants diverted money
they had received from their supplier to a separate account in which they were the only sig-
natories. United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292, 295 (3d Cir. 1978) (Genser I). The funds were
used to purchase municipal bearer bonds but the appellants never reported the funds or the
interest from the bonds as income, nor did they record the money as an asset for corporate
taxation purposes. Id. The appellants were indicted and convicted of income tax evasion and of
subscribing to corporate tax returns which understated their adjusted gross income. Id. at 294.
49. United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1978). In Genser I, the appellants
challenged the district court's refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
summonses, used in the investigation which led to their conviction, had been issued in good
faith and before any recommendation of criminal prosecution. Id. at 299. The Third Circuit
remanded the case with instructions that the district court conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id.
at 311. As noted by the Genser II court, at the evidentiary hearing, the district court found that
all of the summonses were valid because the IRS had remained interested in pursuing civil tax
liabilities throughout the investigation. 595 F.2d at 148. However, finding that the district court
had failed to address the issue of whether the IRS had institutionally committed itself to crimi-
nal prosecution before its recommendation to the Justice Department, the Third Circuit in
Genser II remanded the case for a second evidentiary hearing to make the necessary inquiry.
Id. at 151.
50. 595 F.2d at 150. Recognizing that there are some limitations on such an inquiry, the
court indicated that not every summons issued in an investigation need be examined by the
district court. Id. at 151. Since, under LaSalle, the subjective intent of the individual agent is
not binding on the IRS as an institution, "summonses issued by an investigating agent before
that agent recommended prosecution would be virtually unassailable." Id. The Third Circuit
required affirmative proof to establish that a link exists between each summons and the prof-
fered civil purpose and noted that the presence of certain indicators will entitle the taxpayer to
additional discovery. Id. at 152. Those indicators are: 1) evidence that the Justice Department
influenced the conduct of an IRS investigation; 2) issuance of a summons after the date of the
agent's recommendation of prosecution to his superiors; 3) issuance of a summons during "inor-
dinate and unexplained delays" in recommendation of prosecution. Id.
In Genser, 116 summonses had been issued under § 7602. Id. at 148. While recognizing
the institutional good faith test of LaSalle, the Third Circuit did not find the existence of a
general civil purpose to be dispositive. Id. at 150. The court offered two arguments in support
of its contention that the existence of a general civil purpose is not the only relevant inquiry for
establishing the good faith purpose of a summons: 1) the court claimed that such a test would
allow the IRS to delay recommendation to the Justice Department in order to gather additional
evidence for trial; and 2) such a test would impose an impossible burden of proof on the tax-
payer. Id. The Third Circuit reasoned: '[N]ot only would [the taxpayer] be required to prove a
negative, the nonexistence of a general civil purpose for the investigation, but he also would be
required to disprove what already has been postulated, the congruence of civil and criminal
liability." Id. at 150-51.
51. Id. at 150. In Genser I, the Third Circuit noted that the taxpayer may challenge the
validity of a summons at either the investigatory or the trial stage. 582 F.2d at 302, citing
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. at 537; United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928 (3d Cir.
1976) (finding of an illegal summons may affect the use of the information in subsequent crimi-
nal and civil proceedings). The Genser I court stated that, at the trial level, the "only effective
remedy for violation of [the policy of evaluating the good faith purpose of summonses at en-
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institutional investigation. 5 2 Although Genser II established a presumption
of validity for prerecommendation summonses,5 3 the court held that this
presumption could be overcome by showing that an agent issued a summons
at the request of a United States attorney or that he delayed recommenda-
tion of prosecution at the request of his superiors solely to further a criminal
investigation. 54  Finally, the Third Circuit enumerated guidelines for dis-
covery in cases where the validity of an IRS summons is at issue. 55 These
guidelines indicate that the taxpayer is entitled to know the nature and dates
of any contacts between the IRS and the Department of Justice during the
investigation. 56  If this information raises the suspicion of an improper crim-
inal purpose, the court held that further discovery must be permitted. 57
The participation of a Strike Force in an IRS investigation presents spe-
cial problems for courts applying the LaSalle standard. 58  A Strike Force is a
forcement proceedings] is to require suppression of the evidence obtained as the evidentiary
fruits of an illegal summons." 582 F.2d at 309. Providing a rationale for this interpretation, the
court stated that such a summons "is no less illegal merely because it escapes detection at the
investigatory stage." Id. Further, the court noted that "the prophylactic principles which oper-
ate at the enforcement level are equally appropriate to the trial stage, and suppression is the
only practical remedy at that point to cure the statutory abuse." Id. at 308.
52. 595 F.2d at 151.
53. Id. See-note 50 supra.
54. 595 F.2d at 150. The Third Circuit characterized such actions as abuses that "would go
to the heart of the protections afforded taxpayers by LaSalle." -Id. at 151. In his dissenting
opinion in Genser II, Judge Biggs stressed the combined civil and criminal elements present in
a tax investigation and added that the "IRS must not abandon its institutional authority to
determine the existence of violation of criminal laws relating to taxation." Id. at 154 (Biggs, J.,
dissenting). With regard to the majority's concern about the delays in recommending criminal
prosecution, Judge Biggs found the time factor to be irrelevant where the investigation is con-
cerned with both civil and criminal liability. Id.
55. Id. at 152. For a discussion of these guidelines, see notes 56-57 and accompanying text
infra.
56. 595 F.2d at 152. The court stated:
At a minimum, the taxpayer should be entitled to discover the identities of the inves-
tigating agents, the date the investigation began, the dates the agent or agents filed re-
ports recommending prosecution, the date the district chief of the Intelligence Division or
Criminal Investigation Division reviewed the recommendation, the date the Office of Re-
gional Counsel referred the matter for prosecution, and the dates of all summonses issued
under 26 U.S.C. § 7602. Furthermore, the taxpayer should be entitled to discover the
nature of any contacts, relating to and during the investigation, between the investigating
agents and officials of the Department of Justice.
Id.
57. Id. The Genser II court indicated that, in proper cases, the taxpayer could be given an
opportunity to examine the IRS agents and to discover documents involved in the investigation.
Id. Such examination, the court noted, "should be carefully tailored to meet the purpose of the
inquiry." Id.
The Third Circuit has continued to apply the strict standard of summons-by-summons in-
quiry in two recent post-Serubo cases. See United States v. First Nat'l State Bank, 616 F.2d 668
(3d Cir. 1980) (taxpayer will succeed in a challenge to enforcement where it appears that the
investigating agent has recommended prosecution to his superiors); United States v. Garden
State Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1979) (if allegations of bad faith are factually supported
by the taxpayer's affidavit, the taxpayer is entitled to an evidentiary hearing and to Genser II
discovery).
58. See notes 59-65 and accompanying text infra.
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project coordinated by the Criminal Division of the Justice Department in
which various federal enforcement and regulatory agencies investigate or-
ganized crime subjects. 59  Since the particular focus of a Strike Force inves-
tigation is criminal in nature, courts considering the validity of summonses
issued thereunder must address the question of whether they are issued
solely for a criminal investigation purpose in violation of the LaSalle stan-
dard. 60  In United States v. Chemical Bank, 61 the Second Circuit recognized
that the concern over the presence of a Strike Force stems from the "con-
tinuing cooperation maintained between IRS and the Justice Department
attorneys who coordinate the Strike Force."' 62  The court concluded that,
since cooperation does not, per se, render the IRS an "information-gathering
agency for the Department of Justice," 63 there is no violation of the dictates
of LaSalle.64  Therefore, despite the problem of Strike Force participation,
an affidavit alleging that no evidence had been transmitted to the Depart-
ment of Justice was considered sufficient to establish the good faith purpose
of the investigation. 65
59. See United States v. Chemical Bank, 593 F.2d 451, 456 (2d Cir. 1979), citing IRS
HANDBOOK ON DISCLOSURE OF OFFICIAL INFORMATION, IRM 1272 §§ 4566.6, 4566.7 (1976).
These Joint Strike Forces are coordinated by the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice
and include a representative of the IRS. 593 F.2d at 454. See also note 4 supra.
60. United States v. Chemical Bank, 593 F.2d 451, 456 (2d Cir. 1979).
61. 593 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1979). A revenue agent of the IRS was conducting an in-depth
audit as a member of the Brooklyn Strike Force Program. Id. at 453. A summons was issued as
part of this tax investigation and the corporate taxpayer challenged it as being solely for the
purpose of a criminal prosecution. Id. The court rejected the taxpayer's contention that any IRS
involvement with a Strike Force was forbidden by LaSalle. Id. at 454.
62. Id. at 456. The court reasoned: "At the outset, we cannot assume that the Department
of Justice would create a Strike Force whose very activity would be unlawful from the start." Id.
at 455. It would seem that the involvement of a Strike Force in an IRS investigation would be
highly suspect in the Third Circuit, in light of the language in Genser II to the effect that, if
evidence exists that the Justice Department influenced the conduct of an IRS investigation, a
summons-by-summons inquiry is required. See notes 50-54 and accompanying text supra.
63. 593 F.2d at 456. The critical factor, in the court's view, is that the IRS does not become
"institutionally subservient" to the Department of Justice during periods of cooperation with the
Strike Force, since Revenue agents remain under the control of the Service. Id. The Second
Circuit noted that IRS agents are prevented from becoming conduits for the transmission of
information to the Strike Force by the disclosure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Id.
See generally I.R.C. § 6103(h). Section 6103(h) provides in pertinent part:
In a matter involving tax administration, a return or return information shall be open
to inspection by or disclosure to officers and employees of the Department of Justice
(including United States attorneys) personally and directly engaged in, and solely for their
use in, any proceeding before a Federal Grand Jury or preparation for any proceeding (or
investigation which may result in such proceeding) before a Federal Grand Jury or any
Federal or State court, but only if-
(A) the taxpayer is or may be a party to the proceeding .. .
(B) the treatment of an item reflected on such return is or may be related to the
resolution of an issue in the proceeding or investigation; or
(C) such return or return information relates or may relate to a transactional relation-
ship between a person who is or may be a party to the proceeding and the taxpayer which
affects, or may affect, the resolution of an issue in such proceeding or investigation.
id.
64. 593 F.2d at 456.
65. Id. at 458. The Second Circuit was not the first court of appeals to address the issue of
Strike Force involvement in IRS investigations. In United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 474
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In Serubo, the Third Circuit began its analysis with an examination of
LaSalle, focusing on the Supreme Court's determination that a delay in rec-
ommending prosecution, after an institutional commitment to do so, is im-
permissible as is the situation where the IRS acts as an "information-
gathering agency for other departments." 66 The court viewed this language
as justification for the further proposition that summonses issued after an
agent has recommended prosecution are highly suspect.67 Thus, in Serubo,
the Third Circuit affirmed its holding in Genser I 68 that, in determining
the validity of a suspect IRS summons, the focus must be on the purpose of
each individual summons and not on the general civil purpose of the investi-
gation. 69
Addressing the validity of the summonses issued in the first stage of the
investigation, the Serubo court concluded that there was no need for an
individual determination of the purpose of each one. 70 Since the twenty-
two summonses involved had all been issued long before the IRS had rec-
ommended prosecution, the court found them to be presumptively valid
under the Genser II standard. 71 The court chose to accept the testimony of
the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent that none of the
summonses had been used for a criminal investigation purpose. 72 Further-
F.2d 1234 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973), a pre-LaSalle decision, the Sixth Circuit
remarked that it "does not see why the transmission of information between two different units
of the federal govenment pertaining to a possibility of tax liability should be the subject of
judicial condemnation." 474 F.2d at 1236. Cleveland Trust involved a civil tax investigation
initiated by a Strike Force agent. Id. The district court found bad faith and denied judicial
enforcement of the § 7602 summons. Id. According to the Sixth Circuit, the relevant inquiry
should be whether there was a good faith investigation of civil liability or whether the investiga-
tion was solely for the purpose of criminal prosecution. Id. Further, the court remarked: "[Wie
know of no reason why . . . the fact that information was provided to the civil side of the
Internal Revenue Audit Division by agents usually concerned with criminal prosecution should
immunize the taxpayer corporation from investigation as to its civil liability for additional taxes."
Id. The Second Circuit found this reasoning persuasive and quoted this language in its Chemical
Bank decision. See 593 F.2d at 455, quoting United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 474 F.2d at
1236. See also notes 61-64 and accompanying text supra.
66. 604 F.2d at 811. See United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. at 317. The institu-
tional good faith standard does not permit such action on the part of the IRS. Id. For a discus-
sion of LaSalle, see notes 37-45 and accompanying text supra.
67. 604 F.2d at 811. The court further stated that summonses issued by an agent after he
has decided to recommend prosecution are subject to individual examination to determine
whether any one of them was issued solely to aid a criminal investigation. Id. If this is found to
be the case, "the fruits of that summons would have to be suppressed, even in the face of an
overwhelmingly civil purpose of the investigation as a whole." Id., quoting United States v.
Censer, 595 F.2d at 150.
68. For a review of the Censer 11 standards, see notes 47-57 and accompanying text supra.
69. 604 F.2d at 811. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
70. 604 F.2d at 812-13.
71. Id. at 812. The court explained that Genser 11 was concerned with summonses issued
during a delay occurring after the decision to recommend prosecution has been made. Id. No
evidence of such a delay was found in Serubo. Id.
72. Id. The court stated that, although there was some evidence of contact between the IRS
and the DEA, the district court properly accepted the testimony of the IRS agent that no
evidence had been passed on to the DEA. Id.
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more, while recognizing that, under Genser II, the defendants' request for
further discovery into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of these
summonses would be permissible, 73 the Serubo court did not consider the
denial of the defendants' discovery motion to be an abuse of the district
court's discretion since the minimum Genser II discovery requirements had
been met 74 and there was no evidence of an unexplained delay or an im-
proper criminal investigation purpose. 75
Turning to the second phase of the investigation, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that, under Genser II, a summons-by-summons inquiry was re-
quired.76 Although the summonses in Serubo had been issued before a
recommendation of prosecution, the court found that supervision by a Strike
Force attorney presented "a real likelihood that the IRS was used as an
information-gathering agency" for the Department of Justice in violation of
the LaSalle standard. 77  The court explained that the investigating agent's
testimony that the summonses were not used by the grand jury or at trial
was not a sufficient substitute for judicial inquiry into the basis of each
summons.
7 8
It is submitted that the Third Circuit's application of a summons-by-
summons inquiry as the preferred standard in summons enforcement pro-
ceedings reflects an overly restrictive interpretation of the institutional pos-
ture test set forth in LaSalle.79  Since summonses are issued by individual
agents,80 any inquiry into the purpose of each summons necessarily involves
an examination of that agent's subjective intent.8 ' Such an inquiry shifts the
focus from the institutional posture of the IRS to the individual purpose of
the investigating agent and, as the LaSalle Court pointed out, does not con-
clusively demonstrate the existence of an improper criminal investigation
73. Id. The defendants had requested further discovery in order to attack the credibility of
the IRS agent's testimony that no decision to prosecute and no contact with the DEA agents
had been made during the first stage of the investigation. Id.
74. Id. at 813. For a review of the Censer II discovery requirements, see notes 55-57 and
accompanying text supra.
75. 604 F.2d at 813. It should be noted that the existence of these factors would entitle the
taxpayer to discovery under Genser II. See 595 F.2d at 152; note 56 supra.
76. 604 F.2d at 813.
77. Id. The Third Circuit concluded that a Donaldson-LaSalle violation had been established
with respect to the second stage of the investigation, and thus, that the defendants were enti-
tled to additional discovery. Id.
78. Id. The court noted that Genser I had held that the government has the burden of
showing a "taint-free" basis for the evidence it relies upon in criminal prosecutions. Id. For a
review of Genser 1, see note 49 and accompanying text supra; notes 50-51 supra.
79. For a discussion of the institutional posture test, see notes 41-44 and accompanying text
supra.
80. For a review of the procedure for the issuance of summonses, see notes 27-31 and
accompanying text supra.
81. See United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. at 314; notes 41-42 and accompanying
text supra. Because the purpose of an IRS summons is to obtain facts which will almost always
pertain to both civil and criminal tax liability, an inquiry into the specific purpose of a given
summons will necessarily involve a determination of the individual agent's motivation for issuing
the summons. 437 U.S. at 314.
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purpose.82 Thus, it is submitted that the LaSalle Court's determination that
the only relevant inquiry is whether the IRS has recommended prosecu-
tion, 83 coupled with its specific rejection of the Third Circuit's approach in
United States v. Lafko,8 4 clearly demonstrates the inherent difficulty in
focusing on the purpose of the individual agent to determine whether the
IRS has abandoned the pursuit of civil enforcement. 85
It is suggested that the acceptance, by other circuits, of an affidavit
asserting the continuing good faith purpose of the IRS 86 is an approach
which better effectuates the legitimate goal of civil tax collection by avoiding
enforcement delays due to frivolous challenges and unnecessary litigation,
while still affording relief to the taxpayer upon a clear showing that the sole
objective of the investigation was a criminal prosecution. 87  The Third Cir-
cuit's requirement that the defendant be permitted discovery concerning the
second phase of the investigation represents a rejection of this less restrictive
interpretation of LaSalle,8 8 and shifts the burden from the taxpayer by re-
quiring the IRS to disprove the existence of a solely criminal prosecution
purpose for the investigation. 89  It is submitted that such a result will en-
82. See 437 U.S. at 314; notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra. The LaSalle Court
criticized such an individual focus, stating that it would "unnecessarily frustrate the enforcement
of the tax laws by restricting the use of the summons according to the motivation of a single
agent without regard to the enforcement policy of the Service as an institution." 437 U.S. at
316.
83. 437 U.S. at 313 n. 15. The LaSalle Court stated:
Given the interrelated criminal/civil nature of tax fraud investigation whenever it remains
within the jurisdiction of the Service, and given the utility of the summons to investigate
civil tax liability, we decline to impose the prophylactic restraint on the summons author-
ity any earlier than at the recommendation to the Department of Justice. We cannot deny
that the potential for expanding the criminal discovery rights of the Justice Department or
for usurping the role of the grand jury exists at the point of the recommendation by the
special agent. But we think the possibilities for abuse of these policies are remote before
the recommendation to Justice takes place and do not justify imposing an absolute ban on
the use of the summons before that point. Earlier imposition of the ban, given the bal-
ance of policies and civil law enforcement interests, would unnecessarily hamstring the
performance of the tax determination and collection functions by the Service.
Id. See notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra.
84. 437 U.S. at 313 n. 15. See 520 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1975); notes 43-44 and accompanying
text supra. The Court used the Third Circuit's decision in Lafko as an example of the misin-
terpretation of the recommendation of prosecution issue. 437 U.S. at 313 n. 15, For discussion of
the Lafko decision, see note 36 supra.
85. See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
86. See note 46 and accompanying text supra. These affidavits have been accepted whether
or not Strike Force involvement was present. See cases cited note 46 supra. It should be noted
that the Fourth Circuit considers such an aflidavit to be a "prima facie showing sufficient to
warrant enforcement" of the summons. See United States v. McGuirt, 588 F.2d 419, 421 (4th
Cir. 1978); note 46 supra.
87. See notes 46 & 65 and accompanying text supra.
88. See 604 F.2d at 813; notes 76-78 and accompanying text supra.
89. See note 50 supra. LaSalle, on the other hand, placed a heavy burden of proof on the
taxpayer. See 437 U.S. at 316. In Genser I, the Third Circuit characterized LaSalle's burden of
proof requirement as an "impossible" one. 595 F.2d at 150. See note 50 supra. Instead, Genser
I1 required that the IRS affirmatively prove a link between each summons and the civil purpose
of the investigation. 595 F.2d at 150. By applying this Censer 11 standard in Serubo, and thus
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courage abuse of the discovery process, enforcement delays, and unwar-
ranted challenges designed to disrupt the fair administration of the federal
revenue laws. 90
It is further submitted that the Serubo court's decision to grant addi-
tional discovery concerning the summonses issued during the second phase
of the investigation was based upon the assumption that the very presence of
a Strike Force attorney may render an IRS investigation criminal in na-
ture.9 ' While the court found support for this conclusion in LaSalle,92 it is
suggested that, in the absence of an institutional delay by the IRS in rec-
ommending prosecution, the LaSalle Court would permit Strike Force in-
volvement where, as in Serubo, the agent involved testifies that none of the
evidence obtained from the investigation was used for criminal prosecu-
tion.9 3  While recognizing the legitimacy of the taxpayer's interest in chal-
shifting the burden from the taxpayer to the IRS, it is submitted that the Third Circuit disre-
garded the LaSalle requirement that the burden is upon the taxpayer to disprove the existence
of a valid civil purpose for the summons.
90. For a discussion of the Serubo court's approach, see notes 67-78 and accompanying text
supra. Considering that a summons-by-summons inquiry restricts the ability of the IRS to val-
idly issue summonses if there is any suspicion of criminal involvement, application of the
Genser 11 standard will severely hamper the IRS in its central role-i.e., the pursuit of civil tax
enforcement. See notes 39-44 and accompanying text supra. As was indicated in LaSalle, every
tax investigation will inevitably possess both civil and criminal elements. See 437 U.S. at 314.
Under a summons-by-summons inquiry, discovery would be necessary in practically every case
to determine whether criminal agencies were involved in the investigation or whether indi-
vidual agents had recommended prosecution. See notes 39 & 41 supra. As the LaSalle court
pointed out, any inquiry into the motivation of a single agent "would delay summons enforce-
ment proceedings while parties clash over, and judges grapple with, the thought processes of
each investigator." 437 U.S. at 316 (footnote omitted).
In two subsequent cases, the Third Circuit has continued to apply the strict standard of
summons-by-summons inquiry first articulated in Genser 1I. See note 57 supra.
91. See 604 F.2d at 813. It is evident that the court found the supervision by a Strike Force
attorney during the second phase of the investigation to be serious enough to cast doubt on the
good faith purpose of the IRS. Id. at 812-13. It is submitted, however, that the Serubo court's
decision to credit the testimony of the IRS agent concerning the first phase of the investigation,
but not the second, represents a restrictive stance by the court towards one law enforcement
agency (Strike Force/Justice Department) and a permissive stance towards another (DEA). See
id. at 811-13. Both the DEA and the Strike Force are government agencies charged with inves-
tigating criminal violations. Id. at 809-11. It is equally possible that evidence obtained from
summonses issued during the first phase may have been used by the DEA at some point during
its investigation and later prosecution. Consequently, it is not clear why the Serubo court
reached different conclusions regarding the veracity of the individual agents. See id. It is
suggested, however, that, given LaSalle's recognition of the combined civil and criminal nature
of tax investigations, the presence of either of these agencies bears little relevance to whether
the IRS has maintained its civil interest throughout the investigation. See 437 U.S. at 316. See
also notes 92-95 and accompanying text infra.
92. 604 F.2d at 811. For a review of the language in LaSalle relied upon by the Serulbo
court, see notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra.
93. See note 15 and accompanying text supra. Under LaSalle, it is only when the sole
objective of the IRS, as an institution, is to obtain evidence for use in a criminal investigation
that an impermissible purpose is shown. See 437 U.S. at 316 n. 18. The Serubo court noted that
the investigating agent had not recommended prosecution to his superiors until January, 1977,
and that the IRS had not submitted its formal recommendation to the Justice Department until
1979-19801
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lenging the validity of summonses issued during an IRS investigation,9" the
LaSalle decision clearly evidenced a desire to protect the IRS summons au-
thority from unwarranted or meritless claims designed to undermine en-
forcement of the tax laws. 95  Considering that the creation of the Strike
Force envisioned a consolidated effort of federal agencies,96 it is submitted
that the Second Circuit's conclusion in Chemical Bank, that Strike Force
cooperation does not create a presumption that the IRS is being used as an
information-gathering agency for the Justice Department, 97 is preferable to
that of the Third Circuit in Serubo.98 The interest of the IRS in civil tax
enforcement is not diminished by the presence of criminal allegations, 99 and
the investigating agents remain under IRS control during periods of Strike
Force cooperation, thus decreasing the possibility of Justice Department
domination. 100
Finally, while expressing a concern that Strike Force involvement in an
IRS tax investigation may be impermissible, the Third Circuit in Serubo did
not establish a clear rule as to what degree of Strike Force participation in
such an investigation will invalidate the summonses issued thereunder. Until
the Third Circuit clarifies its holding on this issue, 10 1 Strike Force attorneys
will have no way of determining the contours of acceptable involvement in
tax investigations and the IRS may find it necessary to impose its own limita-
November, 1977. 604 F.2d at 810. Considering that all of the challenged summonses had been
issued by July, 1975-two years prior to any recommendation of prosecution-they were well
within the "safe harbor" created by LaSalle. Id. Furthermore, LaSalle held that the primary
limitation on summons enforcement occurs after the-IRS recommends prosecution to the Justice
Department. See 437 U.S. at 311.
94. 437 U.S. at 315-17. The LaSalle Court attempted to balance the competing interests of
the IRS in civil tax collection and enforcement with those of the taxpayer in challenging the
validity of summonses issued solely for criminal investigation purposes. Id. See notes 39-40 and
accompanying text supra.
95. 437 U.S. at 316-17.
96. See United States v. Chemical Bank, 593 F.2d at 455-56. See notes 58-64 and accom-
panying text supra.
97. See notes 63-64 and accompanying text supra.
98. See United States v. Chemical Bank, 593 F.2d at 456; note 63 supra. The reasoning of
the Second Circuit is highly persuasive when viewed in light of the dual civil and criminal
purposes of tax fraud investigations, the existence of regulatory provisions encouraging coopera-
tion between the IRS and other enforcement agencies, and the existence of statutes designed to
prevent abuses of such cooperation. For a discussion of these factors, see notes 21-26 & 63 and
accompanying text supra.
99. See United States v. LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 311-12. The LaSalle Court recognized that,
even after there has been a recommendation to the Justice Department, the IRS "does not
sacrifice its interest in unpaid taxes just because a criminal prosecution begins." Id.
100. See United States v. Chemical Bank, 593 F.2d at 456. See also note 63 supra.
101. In United States v. Garden State Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1979), the Third
Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Serubo that, where it appears that "an IRS agent was actually
working with the United States Attorney," a summons-by-summons inquiry is required. Id. at
70. See note 57 supra.
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tions on Strike Force cooperation in order to ensure that the fruits of its
investigative efforts are not declared to be the result of an impermissible
overstepping of IRS authority. 10 2
Angela Baker
102. The IRS might limit or refuse cooperation with Strike Force attorneys in order to avoid
summons challenges. Such action, however, may be contrary to IRS regulations providing for
cooperation with other federal agencies, as well as in violation of substantive legislation provid-
ing for IRS disclosure of information to the Justice Department. For a review of these substan-
tive provisions, see notes 23, 25, 59 & 63 supra.
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